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COUNCIL AND COMMISSION
FOURTEENTH REPORT ON THE ACTIVITIES OF THE
MONETARY COMMITTEE
...
Brussels, 12 April 1973
INTRODUCTION
The purpose of this report is to give a brief account of the activities of the Monetary
Committee during the period from 1 January 1972 to the end of 1972.
During this year, the Committee held 15 sessions and the working parties drawn from
its own members or set up at its initiative met on many occasions.
In view of the Council's decision of 13 October 1972 harmonizing the dates of renewal
of the terms of office of the officers and ordinary members of the various committees
as from 1 January 1974 onwards, the Monetary Committee extended the terms of
office of its present officers until 31 December 1973. A list of members as at 31 December
1972 is annexed.
Delegates from the countries joining the C~mmunity on 1 January 1973 (United
Kingdom, Ireland, Denmark) were involved in the work of the Monetary Committee
throughout the period under review, particularly in discussions of international monetary
problems. These countries also joined the mutual information arrangements operating
within the Committee.
The report was adopted as at 31 December 1972.
1. Disturbances in monetary relations in 1971
delayed the implementation of the monetary
measures provided for in the Council' s resolution of
22 March 1971 on the establishment by stages of an
economic and monetary union. The new pattern 
exchange rates agreed in December 1971 in
Washington (the 'Smithsonian' agreement) opened
the way to renewed action in this field. A resolution
adopted by the Council on 21 March 1972 gave new
force to some of the measures contemplated, and one
of the results of this was that a start could be made
on the work of giving the Community its own
monetary personality. The first chapter of this report
summarizes the sequence of events.
However, further waves of speculation again created
difficulties in 1972. At the end of the year, the
situation on the exchange markets was still unstable
since the payments balances of a number of the main
industrialized countries had failed to revert promptlyNo C 94/2 Official Journal of the European Communities 11. 73
to a more satisfactory state of equilibrium; it was
thus still not certain that the new pattern of exchange
rates was the right one. Nor was any overall solution
in sight to the difficulties caused by the steady
increase in international liquidity, the non-convertibi-
lity of the main intervention currency (which had
accumulated in large quantities in the countries
reserves), or to the erratic movements of funds
which tended to continue despite the severe but
uneven restrictions imposed on capital movements by
many countries.
But the dominating factor in economic life in the
Community was almost certainly the strengthening of
inflationary pressure in all the member countries. The
scale of this problem is shown in the brief account of
economic developments given in the second chapter
of this report. The persistence of inflation is making
the achievement of the economic and social objectives
of the Community member countries increasingly
difficult, and inflation control has therefore become a
major policy goal at both national and Community
level.
A third chapter is devoted to the Committee s work
on the establishment of an economic and monetary
union and on the reform of the international
monetary system.
CHAPTER I
ECONOMIC AND MONETARY UNION
2. In 1971, the international monetary crisis had
hampered progress in the first stage towards the
economic and monetary union. In particular, it had
prevented the Member States' central banks from
complying with the ' Council' request that they
should maintain exchange rate fluctuations between
Community currencies within narrower limits than
those imposed by the margins in force for relations
with the US dollar ('the Snake in the Tunnel'). The
leading industrialized countries met in Washington in
December 1971 and agreed to widen to 21/4 % the
fluctuation margins of the currencies around their
parities or central rates. The Committee therefore
drew attention, in its last report, to the serious
disadvantages this measure, when applied to the
Community currencies, would entail for the smooth
working of the Common Market. The Committee felt
that the decision 'not only made possible but also
necessitated the revival of efforts to give the
Community its own monetary personality while
ensuring effective coordination of the short-term
economic policies
The Commission s work from January onwards
enabled the Council to adopt, on 21 March 1972 (1
resolution amplifying certain aspects of the
resolution of 22 March 1971 (2). This was the first
step towards the formation of a separate and
individual monetary area. The prospective member
countries endorsed this Community measure, the
monetary aspects of which are summarized below.
) OJ No C 38, 18. 4. 1972, p. 3.
) OJ No C 28, 27. 3. 1971, p. 1.
3. The Council and the representatives of the
Ivlember States' Governments decided to introduce an
arrangement for the gradual narrowing down of the
exchange margins, intervention to take place in
Community currencies. For this purpose, they called
on the central banks to intervene on their respective
exchange markets so as to scale down to 2.25 %, by
1 July 1972 at latest, the maximum discrepancy that
can occur, at any one time between the Member
States' currencies, while still complying with the
fluctuation margins allowed by the IMF in world
monetary relations (3). As early as 24 April 1972, the
governors of the Member States central banks
implemented the reduction in intra-Community
fluctuation margins. They had previously agreed on
. the arrangements for financing the interventions in
Community currencies and for settling the debit and
credit balances generated by these operations. These
arrangements include very short-term credit facilities
between central banks, settlement of which is based
on a transfer of assets matching the composition of
the debtor central bank's reserves. The central banks
of three prospective Member States acceded to this
agreement in May.
4. After a short period during which it worked as
planned, the intra-Community exchange system ran
into difficulties in June as a result of very heavy
speculation against sterling. After very large-scale
support of sterling, in which the member countries
) Technical details of this arrangement are described in
the July/August 1972 Bulletin of the Banque N ationalc
de Belgique.11. 73 Official Journal of the European Communities No C 94/3
participated and which involved the United Kingdom in substantial losses of reserves the British
Government decided on 23 June 1972 to suspend
intervention at the exchange rate limits  2.25 %
either side of parity  and to suspend its
participation in the arrangement designed to narrow
the fluctuation margins of the currencies of the
Community countries. Because of the close monetary
ties between the United Kingdom and Ireland, the
Irish authorities followed suit. At the end of 1972, the
effective devaluation of sterling  now floating 
was roughly 10 % in comparison with the former
official parity.
On 28 June, Denmark suspended implementation of
the agreement (the 'snake ), but continued to hold its
currency within the margins set  vis-a-vis  the dolLu
(the 'tunnel' ). However, from 10 October 1972
onwards, Denmark reverted to the new Community
system, while reserving the right, at the time, to
choose what means it would use for implementing
the necessary intervention measures.
To enable it to cope with any repercussions of the
sterling crisis on the Italian exchanges, the Banca
Italia was authorized on 26 June 1972 to intervene
temporarily in dollars as well as in Community
currencies, with a view to ensuring the maintenance of the narrower intra-Community fluctuation
margins: in view of the losses of reserves incurred by
the Banca d'ltalia, this waiver, which was originally
intended to last only until 30 September, was
extended until 31 December 1972.
Speculation against sterling was followed by pressure
on the dollar, strengthened by the sharp upward
trend in gold prices from January onwards. The
countries affected most by the renewed surge of
dollar inflows  mainly Germany, Japan and
Switzerland  adopted measures which probably
helped to stem the flow for a time.
5. On 21 March 1972, the Council also adopted
the directive on regulating international capital flows
and neutralizing their undesirable effects on domestic
liquidity which had been proposed by the
Commission on 23 June 1971 (1). The directive calls
on the Member States to strengthen machinery
already available to them by creating certain specified
instruments. These instruments are to be used by the
national authorities, but the latter must bear in mind
the interests of their Community partners.
The monetary events in June again highlighted the
need for effective shielding against disruptive capital
movements, and a number of Member States
therefore adopted, strengthened or began studying
) OJ No L 91, 18. 4. 1972, p. 13.
various measures in line with the objectives of the
directive.
6. With a view to more effective coordination of
the short-term economic policies, a working party
~as set up and attached to the Council, comprising
one representative of the responsible Minister or
Ministers in each Member State and one Commission
representative. The working party s purpose is to
ensure a permanent flow of information between the
Member States on their short-term economic and
financial policies and the coordination of these
policies within the guidelines defined by the Council.
In addition, the Commission was instructed to table
in the Council as soon as possible a propose4
directive designed to promote stability, growth and
full employment in the Community.
7. Lastly, the resolution of 21 March 1972
confirmed the instruction set out in the resolution of
22 March 1971 calling on the Monetary Committee
and the Committee of Governors to submit by 30
June 1972 at latest a report on the organization, the
functions and the statute of a European monetary
cooperation fund which would later take, its place as
part of a Community organization of the central
banks.
Having read the report and the relevant Opinions
(see sec. 19), the finance ministers of the enlarged
Community agreed, on 12 September 1972 in Rome,
to set up the fund during the first stage of the
economic and monetary union, ahd to entrust its
management to the Committee of Governors of the
central banks, under general economic policy;
guidelines adopted by the Council.
The ministers agreed that the European monetary
cooperation fund should at the outset, have the
following tasks:
concerted action between central banks for the
purpose of narrowing down exchange rate
margInS;
multHateralization of claims and liabilities,
resulting from financing in Community
currencies, and multilateralization of intra-Com-
munity settlements; 
use for this purpose of a European monetary unit
of account;
management of short-term monetary support
between the central banks.
In view of the new requirements, it was decided that
the very short-term facilities deriving from the
agreement on narrower margins and the short-term
monetary support would be linked up in the fund
through new machinery. For this purpose, there is toNo C 94/4 Official Journal of the European Communities 11. 73
be a technical adjustment of the short-term support
but there will be no change in the main features: in
particular the consultation procedures will not be
affected.
8. The ministerial agreement was approved in the
declaration adopted at the end of the Conference
held in Paris on 19 and 20 October 1972, by the
heads of state or government of the member
countries of the enlarged Community. By confirming
all parts of the measures adopted by the Council and
by the representatives of the Member States on
22 March 1971 and 21 March 1972, including the
principle of parallel progress in the various fields of
economic and monetary union, the heads of state or
government again made clear on this occasion that
the Member States are determined to build up a
definitive economic and monetary union. The
necessary decisions are to be taken during 1973 to
enable the Community to move on to the second
stage of the economic and monetary union on 1
January 1974, with a view to its completion by 31
December 1980 at latest.
The heads of state or government also stated that
fixed but adjustable parities between their currencies
were indispensible if the union was to be achieved
and expressed their intention to establish within the
Community defence and mutual support machinery
cnabling the Member States to ensure compliance
with this principle. For this purpose, they decided
that the European monetary cooperation fund must
be set up before 1 April 1973 (1). In addition, the
Community bodies involved, including the Monetary
Committee, were instructed to report on the
adjustment of the short-term monetary support
system by 30 September 1973 and on the gradual
pooling of reserves by 31 December 1973 (2
(I) On 3 April 1973 the Council adopted a regulation
establishing the European monetary cooperation fund
(OJ No L 89 4. 1973, p. 2).
e) The two dates were brought forward to 30 June in
connection with the events which led the Council to
decide early in 1973 to speed up the implementation
of the monetary union.
CHAPTER II
ECONOMIC AND MONETARY DEVELOPMENTS IN THE ENLARGED COMMUNITY
9. This chapter is devoted to an outline of
short-term economic trends and of the inflation
problem, covered first in the six countries of the old
Community and then in the three prospective
member countries (1
Although only a temporary respite was achieved as a
result of the general realignment of exchange rates in
December 1971, the decisions taken helped to create
better conditions for the expansion of trade, which
was also spurred on by faster growth in a number of
leading industrialized countries. Business was
booming in the United States in particular, where the
upsurge was associated with  slower rate of
inflation. Real GNP growth was more than 6 % in
1972, compared with 2.7 % in 1971, while the
implicit GNP price index increased by only 3,5 
compared with 4,7 %.
10. In the Community, the rate of growth rose a
little in the first months of the year in almost all the
countries, partly as a result of fortuitous factors
) These trends are illustrated by statistical tables given
in Annex II.
(notably the exceptionally warm weather), but then
grew more moderate. However, there was evidence in
the later months of the year that growth was
gathering momentum once again. None the less, the
increase in volume in the gross Community product
was scarcely higher than the rate achieved 
1971 (3.7 %, compared with 3,4 
%) 
(see Table 1).
The figure is the composite measure of virtually
unchanged growth in the Netherlands, a slight
increase in Germany, Belgium and France, and, in
Italy and Luxembourg, a substantial increase over the
low rates recorded in 1971.
In most of the countries, export demand was the key
to overall demand trends in the early months: in
Italy and in Luxembourg, indeed, this was the case
throughout the year.
However, domestic demand played a steadily more
important role as a growth factor: stimulated mainly
by the sharp increase in available incomes of
households private consumers expenditure
expanded vigorously. On the other hand, the trend of
investment by firms lacked vigour in almost all the
countries for most of the year: in Italy and the
Netherlands, there was an actual decline.11. 73 Official Journal of the European Communities No C 94/5
11. The strains on the employment markers which
were still discernible at the beginning of the year in
most of the member countries gradually eased. None
the less, in Germany, and, to a lesser extent, in
France, the increase in the number of foreign workers
did not suffice to eliminate the manpower shortage.
Despite the revival of economic activity, the
unemployment rate was higher, at the end of 1972,
than in the previous year, in most of the countries.
The change in the pattern is probably largely due to
structural factors, such as unemployment among
school-Ieavers, insufficient labour mobility from area
to area, and the shortage of skilled workers, which is
partly a result of the difficulty of adapting worker
skills to technical progress.
12. Despite the moderate expansion of economic
activity, the rate of inflation remained high
throughout the year: early in the autumn, it actually
gathered momentum in all the countries.
In previous years, economic relations with other
countries had helped to aggravate inflationary pres-
sure in the member countries: the increase in the
prices of imported raw materials had this effect in
1972. For some time, however, internal causes have
been steadily gaining in importance in the group 
factors forcing prices up within the Community. In
this connection, the shortage of certain agricultural
items and the persisting upward pressure of wage
costs, the increase in which was running well ahe:-!d
of productivity gains in all the countries, were
particularly important. All in all, the increase in the
Community s consumer prices was even sharper than
in 1971  (see  Table No 2).
13. Economic trends in the prospective member
countries shared common features with those in the
Community: heavy inflationary strain and moderate
growth, except in Denmark, where neither technical
capacities nor labour resources were fuJly utilized.
However, unemployment declined in the second half
of the year in the United Kingdom and in Denmark
(in Ireland, it showed a slight further increase).
14. After live1y expansion in the first part of the
year, the member countries' exports to non-member
countries slowed down. There was another spurt in
the later months of the year to give a total rate of
growth for 1972 of 11.9 %, the increase of imports
being 6,9 %. Given these trends and the improvement
in the terms of trade for the member countries
resulting from the exchange rate realignment, the
Community s merchandize trade balance showed a
surplus of about $ 4700 million compared with
$ 1 500 million in 1971 (cif-fob, on the basis of
customs returns).
The external payments situations of the three
prospective members developed along divergent lines.
For Ireland and particularly for Denmark, the current
accounts closed with smaller deficits than for 1971
but there was a sharp deterioration in the United
Kingdom s current account because of poor external
trading results: the current account surplus of
1 051 million for 1971 dwindled to practically
nothing in 1972.
15. Despite the increase in the deficit on
unrequited transfers the surplus on the 'old'
Community current account showed a further
increase. However because of relatively calm
conditions on the exchanges, net imports of long-
and short-term capital were appreciably lower than
in 1971, so that the surplus on the overall balance of
payments declined from $ 8 000 million to $ 5 500
million. The surplus was reflected in an increase in
the monetary authorities' exchange assets (gold and
foreign exchange reserves, IMF position, SDRs) of
$ 6 700 million and a deterioration in the banks' net
short-term external position of $ 1 200 million (see
Table No 3 for the trend in the external situation by
country).
Capital movement trends played a key role in 1972 in
the external situation of the United States as well:
this country deficit (official settlements was cut
from $ 30400 million for 1971 to $ 10300
million. What happened was that  very heavy
outflow of short-term capital in 1971 gave way to a
modest movement in the other direction in 1972.
There was also a decline in the deficit on long-term
capital, this being the result of a decline in direct
American investment abroad and of an increase in
foreign portfolio investment in the United States. On
the other hand, with imports, particularly from Japan
and Canada, soaring, the merchandize trade balance
closed with a record deficit of $ 6 800 million
(against $ 2 700 million in 1971): the composite
result was that the deficit on the basic balance came
very close to that recorded for 1971.
16. In the early part of the year, the authorities in
all the member countries felt that there was little
cause to change the economic policies (which were
expansionary, though not to the same extent in each
country) which they had been conducting since the
second half of 1971, the aim being to forestall any
appreciable decline in economic activity. However, as
the recovery steadily gained strength and the upward
price movement gathered momentum officialNo C 94/6 Official Journal of the European Communities 11. 73
measures gradually became more restrictive in those
countries nearest full employment. Where public
finance policy failed to help curb inflation, monetary
and credit policy was the main weapon used.
Measures were taken to curtail the rapid growth of
the money supply  usually due to the excessive
expansion of bank credit  which had accompanied
the increase in inflationary strain (see Tables 4 and 5).
A number of countries also strengthened policy by
direct price and income controls.
17. The Community authorities were well aware
of the close links of independence which have now
developed between economic trends in the
Community countries and of the threat which
continuing inflationary pressure represents for the
harmonious working of the Community. They
therefore decided to support national measures 
concerted action.
Thus, on 5 December 1972, the Council adopted a
resolution, based on a Commission draft, on inflation
control (1), under which the Member States are to
endeavour to reduce the rate of increase in consumer
prices to 4 % between December 1972 and the end of
1973. The new Member States accepted this target
and declared themselves willing to implement the
measures required, subject to adjustments necessary
to their respective situations.
The Council still regards monetary policy as having a
key role to play in the overall measures taken in the
various fields of economic policy to achieve the
inflation control objective. The resolution includes a
commitment for the Member States to slow down
gradually the rate of growth of the money supply
(money and near-money) until it matches that of real
GNP plus a 'normative rate of increase as regards
prices' determined in relation to overall economic
policy goals, account being also taken of the
structural development of the relationship between
money supply and national product. This objective is
to be achieved by the end of 1974. The resolution
also designates the range of instruments which
should be available to the Member States if they are
to be able to take prompt action on interest rates
) OJ No C 133 23. 12. 1972, p. 12.
liquidity, and, as necessary, the volume of credit.
Lastly, to prevent t~e expected impact of the use of
these instruments being offset by unwanted inflows
of capital from outside, the Member States were
invited to strengthen their control machinery in this
area, as appropriate. This was done early in 1973.
18. Since the adoption of this resolution many
measures have been taken or strengthened in the
countries of the enlarged Community, particularly in
the area of monetary policy. In all the countries, the
refinancing rates charged by the central banks have
been raised. For example, by the end of the year, the
discount rate  usually rising  was 9 % in the
United Kingdom, 8 % in Ireland, 7,5 % in France
7 % in Denmark S % in Belgium, 4,5  in the
Republic of Germany and 4 % in Italy and in the
Netherlands (see Table No 6). The upward
movement in interest rates was also lively on the
money markets and substantial (though not to the
same degree in each country) on the capital markets
of almost all the nine countries.
Action to slow down the growth in the money supply
was taken and measures already in force were
tightened up by the countries which had already
introduced restrictive machinery: in Germany, the
discount ceilings for the credit institutions were
lowered several times. In France, the compulsory
reserve requirements were made more stringent, partly
by an increase from 15 to 33 % in the reserve ratio
applying to incremental credit, and the terms for
personal loans and the financing of housing were
made more severe. In Belgium, the gentlemen
agreement between the Banque N ationale and the
banks on the 'sterilization' of funds was extended
and its scope widened. In Luxembourg, the
authorities introduced quantitative restriction of
consumer credit. The Bank of England used the
special deposits technique. The central bank
authorities in Ireland introduced a liquidity
coefficients system to facilitate credit control, and the
central bank of Denmark extended credit ceiling
restrictions and increased the various ratios in force
governing the commercial banks' indebtedness with
the central bank.11. 73 Official Journal of the European Communities No C 94/7
CHAPTER III
THE ACTIVITIES OF THE MONETARY COMMITTEE
19. As stated in the Introduction, the Committee
was mainly concerned with work towards the
economic and monetary union and with the reform
of the international monetary system.
From the beginning of the year, the Commitlee
assisted the Commission in the drafting of the
proposed resolution which was adopted by the
Council on 21 March 1972. As already reported, the
resolution invited the Committee to draft a report
with the Committee of Governors on the
organization, the functions and the statute of the
European monetary cooperation fund. On the basis
of a report drafted by a joint working party of the
two Committees, the latter submitted Opinions to the
Council and the Commission on 5 September and 
September 1972 respectively (1), and the finance
ministers drew heavily on these Opinions in
establishing the main features of the fund when they
met in Rome (see sec. 7).
20. The Committee had been asked in 1971 
advise on the drafting of the directive for the control
of international financial flows, a directive which was
also adopted by the Council on 21 March 1972. It
provides that the Committee will assist the
Commission in the maintenance of close coordination
between the policies pursued in this area by the
relevant authorities of the Member States. For this
purpose, the Committee set up an  ad hoc  working
party in March to list all the instruments, whether
provided for or not by the directive, available to the
Member States. Subsequently, in October the
Committee set up a new working party to carry out a
collective scrutiny of the use of the instruments and
of those instruments which the Member States might
establish in the future.
21. As part of its preparatory work on the
Commission s inflation control proposals (see sec.
17), the Committee examined, on the basis of a
report drafted by its alternates, monetary measures
suitable for inclusion in a comprehensive programme.
However it ascertained that the appreciable
differences between the current economic situations
in the various member countries and in the degree of
) The Monetary Committee Opinion is given in
Annex III.
importance attached to the correlation between the
money supply changes and price trends meant that
the achievement of such an objective would involve
differing degrees of restraint and differing timings in
the various countries. Moreover, the instruments
were not the same in the various countries and were
not used in the same ways, so that the Committee felt
that the countries should be free in their choice of
measures, though it recognized that it would be in
the interests of the Community countries as a whole
to supplement and harmonize these instruments at
some time in the future.
22. The Committee kept the monetary and
financial situations of the Member States under
review: it held several consultation meetings  for
example, further to the decision taken by the British
government in June.
It also adopted two Opinions (2) for submission to
the Council and to the Commission: the first
concerned the rate of conversion of sterling and the
Irish pound into units of account or into any other
currency for transactions to be carried out under the
common agricultural policy; the second concerned
problems deriving from the Commission s proposed
Council directive for the elimination of restrictions
on freedom of establishment and freedom to supply
services in connection with ' self-employment
activities of banks and other financial establishments.
The second Opinion, drafted on the basis of the
work of an  ad hoc  group, led to the establishment of
a list of banking services in the directive now being
adopted by the Council. Lastly, in accordance with
the Council resolution of 21 March 1972, the
Committee was consulted by the Commission on a
draft directive designed to promote stability, growth
and full employment in the Community.
23. The working party on securities markets
carried out its regular examinations of trends on the
capital markets in the member countries and on the
international markets. It also endeavoured to
ascertain what facilities would enable the
coordination of the Member States' policies on their
) These Opinions are annexed (Annex III).No C 94/8 Official Journal of the European Communities 9. 11. 73
capital markets to be strengthened. It reported on its
work to the Committee, which approved the
findings (1
24. As in previous years, the Committee spent a
large proportion of its time on international
monetary problems. It discussed methods of
establishing a common standpoint on the
fundamental objectives of the reform of the
international monetary system, the establishment of
the Committee of the Twenty as a new forum for
negotiations, and the possible activation of special
drawing rights for the second period. Its findings as
to the fundamental objectives were used as a basis for
the agreement reached at the conference which the
finance ministers of the future Community held in
London on 17 and 18 July 1972. The agreement,
confirmed at the Summit Conference held in Paris on
19 and 20 October is based on the following
principles: fixed but adjustable parities; general
convertibility of currencies; effective international
regulation of the world supply of liquidity; a
reduction in the role of national currencies as reserve
instruments; effective and equitable functioning of
the adjustment process; equal rights and duties for all
participants in the system; the need to lessen the
unstabilizing effects of short-term capital movements;
the taking into account of the interests of the
developing countries.
These objectives were recalled by the Member States
at the annual meeting of the International 1-10netary
Fund held in Washington from 25 to 29 September
(1) This report is given in Annex V.
1972. Though not necessarily endorsing all of them
all the participants at this meeting recognized the
need for a reform of the international monetary
system and declared their readiness to open effective
negotiations.
25. In view of the value of establishing a single
viewpoint, as among the nine countries, for the
negotiations, the Committee decided to hold
systematic concertation meetings concerning the
agenda items for the meetings of the alternates and
the members of the Committee of Twenty, which is
studying all aspects of the reform problem.
For this reason and in implementation of the study
tasks entrusted to it by the London conference of
finance ministers, the Committee devoted a large
number of meetings in the latter months of 1972 and
the early months of 1973 to examining problems
connected with the choice of the 'numeraire' for  ;:he
new system and with the unfreezing of gold, with
settlement in reserve assets and the consolidation of
dollar balances, with the control of short-term capital
movements, with the adjustment process and with the
utilization in this context of quantitative indicators.
On this last problem, the Committee succeeded in
defining the outline of a single position which was
recorded in a memorandum transmitted to the
alternates of the Committee of Twenty (2). This
position was also explained by the current chairman
of the Council of the European Communities at the
ministerial meeting of the Committee of Twenty held
in Washington on 26 and 27 March 1973.
) Attached as Annex IV.
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ANNEX II
TABLE 1
EXP ANSION OF GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT (VOLUME)
(in %)
1971/1970 1972/1971
Federal Republic  of  Germany
Belgium
France
2.7 2.9
3.7 3.8
5,0 5.3
1.4 2.9
0-7 3.5
4,3 4.2
3,4 3.7
4,3 5.1
3,0 3,0
1.2 2.4
Italy
Luxembourg
Netherlands
Community  of  the Six
Denmark
Ireland
United Kingdom
TABLE 2
CONSUMER PRICE INCREASES
Federal Republic  of  Germany
Belgium
France
(in %)
December 1971 December 1972
December 1970 December 1971
5.8 6,5
5,6 6,4
6,0 6,9
4,7 7,4
5.4 5.9
8-4 7,9
5.1 7,3
8,6 (1 8.2 (l)
9,0 7,7
Italy
Luxembourg
Netherlands
Denmark
Ireland
United Kingdom
) November/November.9. 11. 73 Official Journal of the European Communities No C 94/11
TABLE 3
BALANCE OF PAYMENTS
(in millions of European u. a.
Current Long-term Short-term Allocation payments capital Total
(1) capital of SDRs
Federal Republic
of Germany
1971 310 1786 2053 171 + 4 320
1972 378 3719 507 170 + 4774
BLEU
1971 830 226 580
1972 1023 454 179 461
France
1971 525 1334 161 + 2 023
1972 525 725 530 160 490
Italy
1971 789 128 107 964
1972 (3 929 106 835
Netherlands
1971 128 336 600
1972 1205 718 355 916
Denmark
1971 420 400 103 111
1972 380 165 151
Ireland
1971 168 374 268
1972 144 254 122
United Kingdom
1971 2523 5224 300 + 8 047
1972 - 3 078 297 - 2 738
) On a transactions basis for FRG, France, Denmark, Ireland and the United Kingdom; settlements for BLEU, Italy
and the Netherlands.
) Including residual items; not including bank operations in the case of the countries of the old Community.
) December 1971 until November 1972.
TABLE 4
EXPANSION OF MONEY SUPPLY
December 1971 December 1972
December 1970 December 1971(1)
Federal Republic of Germany 12.3 14.5 14.6 17.
BLEU 10.1 12.3 14.0 16.1
France 11.1 17.6 15.4 (2 18.5 (2
Italy 18.8 17.3 19.1 18.9
Netherlands 15.0 8.1 17.6 11.8
Denmark 10.0 9,6 17.1 15.1
Ireland 16.0 14.2
United Kingdom 10.9 13.0 (4 13.6 25.8 (4
M 1 = Money supply.
M 2 = Money supply plus near-money or secondary liquidity.
) November 1972/November 1971, Italy.
) Provisional figures.
) Figures not available owing to a strike in the banking sector.
) M 3.
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TABLES
EXPANSION OF BANK LENDING TO FIRMS AND INDIVIDUALS
(in 
December 1971 December 1972
December 1970 December 1971
+ 13,8 + 15.9 .
+ 20.2 + 22.5
+ 12.6 + 16.1
+ 14.4 + 16.1
+ 15.4 + 18.6
+ 31.8 + 36.6
4.4 + 12.3
+ 33.6
+ 17.3 + 51.11
Federal Republic of Germany
France
Italy e)
Netherlands
Belgium (1
Luxembourg (1
Denmark
Ireland
United Kingdom
) September 1972.
) Bank employees' strike.
TABLE 6
BANK RA TE
(in 
31 December 31 March 30 June 30 September 31 December
1971 1972 1972 1972 1972
Federal Republic
of Germany
BLEU
France 53/4, 53/4,
Italy
Netherlands
Denmark
Ireland 413/16 413/16 61/ 73/16
United Kingdom9. 11. 73 Official Journal of the European Communities No C 94/13
ANNEX  III
Brussels, 17 January 1972
OPINION OF THE MONET.A:R Y COMMITTEE
In accordance with instructions given by the Council at its session of 8 and 9 June 1970, the
Committee has examined certain problems connected with the Commission s proposed Council
directive on the elimination of restrictions on freedom  of  establishment and freedom to supply
services in respect of the 'self-employment' activities of banks and other financial establishmentS.
As a result of this discussion, the Committee has ascertained that freedom of establishment and
freedom to supply services not connected with capital movements raise no credit-policy
problems for the Member States.
With regard to services connected with capital movements, the Committee feels that the Council
directive should apply at this stage solely to the services connected with the transactions in lists
A and B annexed to the first and second directives on the liberalization of capital movements.
The Committee believes that the draft directive should be accompanied by the attached list of
services connected with the transactions.
Canvassing also raises a problem, which is not a monetary policy problem, but is connected
with the protection of the saver. In so far as canvassing has monetary implications, a technical
solution should be found establishing conditions for non-residents matching those for residents.
Lastly, the need to prevent the monetary policy of one country being neutralized by heavy
capital counter-movements has led the Committee to propose that a clause be included
stipulating that the directive cannot be used in such a way as to hamper cooperation between
monetary authorities of the Member States.
ANNEX
Table of banking services corresponding to the capital movements mentioned in lists A and B of
Annex I of the first Directive of 11 May 1960, amplified and amended by the second Directive
of 18 December 1962 (1
LIST A
Direct investments
Commercial and financial information (commercial prospecting, information on the
customer s solvency, statistics, forwarding of accounting information),
Assistance and representation in relations with the authorities (administrative and legal) and
other agencies
Consultancy and assistance to firms with a view to mergers (search for possible partners
abroad, expert advice, etc),
(1) The headings underligned correspond to those in lists A and B of the Directives on capital movements
mentioned.No C 94/14 Official Journal of the European Communities 9. 11. 73
Assistance in large acquisitions of shareholdings (eg for takeover bids) with a view to
acquiring control of a firm (stock exchange formalities, assessments of asset values and
financial assessments, etc),
Physical exchange of securities (1),
Custody of securities,
Issue of securities assigned to shareholders.
Liquidation of direct investments
Commercial and financial information (commercial prospecting, etc),
Assistance and representation in relations with the authorities (administrative and legal) and
other agencies
Consultancy and assistance to firms with a view to facilitating liquidation operations
Assistance in large sales of shares
Physical exchange of securities
Custody of securities.
Real estate investments and their liquidation
Commercial and financial information
Assistance and representation in relations with the authorities (administrative and legal) and
other agencies
Consultancy and assistance to firms with a view to facilitating liquidation operations,
Asset management (assistance and representation for the maintenance of the asset, letting,
etc),
Assistance for the constitution and the mobilization (if appropriate) of sureties and
guarantees of all kinds not granted by a bank.
Personal capital movements
Management of bequeathed assets (payment of taxes, search for missing persons, etc).
Granting and repayment of short- and medium-term credits related to commercial transactions
or to the supply of services in which a resident is participating
Assistance and representation in relations with the authorities (administrative and legal) and
other agencies
Consultancy and assistance to firms with a view to facilitating liquidation operations,
Consultancy in matters of financing of undertakings
Debt recovery,
Cashing of securities
Domiciliation of securities.
Management of documentary credits
Assistance for the constitution and the mobilization (if appropriate) of sureties and
guarantees of all kinds not granted by a bank,
(1) The securities are defined in the explanatory notes annexed to the first Directive for the implementation 
Article 67. The definition has been followed in this table.9. 11. 73 Official Journal of the European Communities No C 94/15
Blocking of types of security belonging to a customer and guaranteeing an obligation of this
customer with regard to a third party,
Canvassing for third parties,
Services connected with a factoring operation.
Guarantees of existing debts, other guarantees and pledges and transfers connected with them
(sureties and guarantees granted by a bank)
Estate duties
Tax information,
Fiscal guarantees.
Other list A capital transactions
The corresponding bank transactions are in fact transfer payments only.
LIST B
Operations in securities dealt in on a stock exchange, excluding units of unit trusts
Assistance for the issue of bearer certificates representing securities previously issued and
dealt in on a stock exchange,
Formalities for securities (stamping, renewal of coupon sheets, exchanges, renewal
regrouping, division, destruction),
Financial service (payment of coupons, reimbursement of securities, assistance for the
exercise of drawing and subscription rights, etc),
Financial information (current information, analysis, etc),
Advice for investment in stock exchange securities (1
Management of a portfolio of stock exchange securities (1
Acceptance and execution of instructions for the exercise of the rights of bearers of stock
exchange securities (eg representation at shareholders' meetings and before the courts),
Custody of securities
Conversion of securities
, ,
Assistance for operations connected with the stock exchange quotation of securities assigned
to the holders of stock exchange securities
Canvassing for third parties in respect of stock exchange securities, search for a party
contracting in his own name for the acquisition or sale of stock exchange securities,
Operation as offsetting fund.
(1) These services concern both individuals and institutional investors.
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OPINION TO THE COUNCIL AND THE COMMISSION
Brussels, 12 July 1972
Article 2 of Regulation No 129 of 23 October 1962 provides that, for the conversion of any
currency into another currency for operations to be carried out under the common agricultural
policy, the exchange rate to be applied will be that which corresponds to the par value
communicated to the IMF.
Further to the decision taken by the British and Irish authorities to d~scontinue for the time
being compliance with the fluctuation limits provided for in current international agreements
the Committee is of the opinion that, pursuant to Article 3 of the same Regulation, the value of
sums denominated in sterling or in Irish pounds, should in future, for the purposes of
conversion into units of account or into any other currency, be calculated by reference to their
market rates in terms of dollars.
OPINION DELIVERED TO THE COUNCIL AND TO THE COMMISSION
Brussels, 5 September 1972
In the Resolutions of the Council and the representatives
of the Governments of the Member States on 22 March
1971 and 21 March 1972, the Monetary Committee and
the Committee of Governors of Central Banks were asked
to present a report on the organization, functions and
articles of a European Monetary Cooperation Fund.
Acting on these terms of reference, the two Committees
set up a joint group of experts which, on 1 June 1972
presented a report, enclosed with the present Opinion as
an annex, on the basic technical aspects of the problem.
At its sessions of 11 July and 5 September 1972, the
Monetary Committee examined this report and
concentrated its discussions on the fundamental options
open in the matter.
I. Questions of principle
The Committee feels that the creation of a Fund is just
one of the measures envisaged in the Council Resolution
of 21 March 1972 on the establishment by stages of
economic and monetary union the others being:
coordination of monetary policies, increased convergence
of economic policies, adoption of appropriate measures in
the fields of regional and structural policy, tax
harmonization gradual development of a capital market
narrowing of margins, regulation of capital movements.
The Committee takes the view that it will be absolutely
necessary in an ultimate stage to establish a European
system of central banks and to pool monetary reserves if
economic and monetary union is to be achieved. The
creation of a Fund may be considered as an initial
contribution towards this objective, and any assessment of
its value should be made in the light of the contribution it
represents.
One purpose of such a Fund, at all events, would be to
facilitate the settlement between partners of positions
resulting from interventions in Community currencies in
connection with the narrowing of margins.
Over and above this objective, some members of the
Committee feel that the Fund should organize mutual
support of the member countries' currencies, and ensure
that their reserves are better used, by supplying the
member countries with  sufficient volume of
unconditional credits to finance reversible capital
movements, without, however, slackening balance-of-pay-
ments discipline. This approach would also highlight the
will of the EEC monetary authorities to defend their
currencies jointly and severally against monetary
disruptions caused by factors outside the fundamental
economic trends in one or more member countries.
Some members consider that the functions of such a Fund
should develop in line with the evolution of economic and
monetary integration in the Community. Finding that the
convergence of the member countries' economic policies is
still insufficient, they feel that the creation of a Fund
should not give rise to an extension of the credit facilities
already available. In any case, conditions would have to
be attached to any additional credits and they would thus
fall outside the competence of the central banks and the
authority of the Fund. It should be borne in mind here
that, in addition to the credit machinery planned in
connection with the narrowing of margins, and the
machinery of short-term monetary support, means for
providing conditional credit already exist in the
Community in the shape of the machinery for
medium-term financial assistance approved by the Council
on 22 March 1971. This machinery should not be
incorporated in the Fund, as the Fund will have to be11.73 Official Journal of the European Communities No C 94/17
administered by the Committee of Governors of Central
Banks, whereas the Government authorities are
responsible for the medium-term machinery.
II. Functions of a fund
The report by the group of exports gives a detailed survey
of the tasks which might be entrusted to a Fund at the
various stages of its development and which are analysed
under A, B, C and D below. The Committee examined
the functions which the Fund could be given in the initial
stage. However, the Committee did not consider it
advisable to fix a timetable for the follow-up to these
initial functions, as this is largely dependent, firstly on the
experience gained in the early stages of the Fund'
operation and secondly on progress achieved in
establishing economic and monetary union.
A. Concertation
Although the Committee acknowledged that a Fund
should be created for more purposes than simple
concertation between central banks as part of the
machinery for narrowing the margins of fluctuation
between the currencies of the Community countries, the
Committee nevertheless feels that the Fund should be
responsible for this concertation task. The methods of
concertation could be those set out in paragraphs 21-26 of
the report by the group of experts.
B.  Multilateralization
The Committee reviewed the various procedures of
multilateralization of the positions resulting from
interventions in Community currencies and 
intra-Community settlements connected with these
interventions, i.e. transformation of bilateral claims and
debts into claims on and debts with the Fund and their
expression in units of account (paragraphs 27-43 of the
report). All the members of the Committee are, in
principle, in favour of multilateralization of this kind.
In this section of their report, the experts also dealt with
the question of the Fund's management of short-term
monetary support, in particular as a link-up between the
credit facilities envisaged in the agreement on the
narrowing of margins. For the longer the period fixed for
the settlement of positions, the greater are the possibilities of multilateralization. 
At all events, the Committee feels that the Fund should
also be responsible for the management of short-term
monetary support. It further considers that certain
technical adjustments should be made to this support
mechanism, to enable it to be incorporated in the Fund.
Some members feel that if the two short-term credit
instruments are to be linked within the Fund, they should
not be modified as regards the amount, the period and the
conditions of financing. Other members take the view that
recourse to the credit facilities available in the system
should be made more automatic. A third current of
opinion advocates the establishment of 'revised
machinery which would include the two earlier
instruments in a more flexible and more effective
framework and would be equipped with more extensive
credit facilities that would be made available to the Fund
either on its creation or gradually thereafter.
C.  Pooling of reserves
The Committee examined the different lines of thought
on the pooling of reserves (paragraphs 44-55 of the
report). .
The majority of the members feel that at the present time
it would be premature to pool reserves, even partially,
because the necessary economic conditions have not yet
been fulfilled. On the other hand, some members are of
the opinion that the pooling of at least a small fraction of
the reserves would, as the report states (paragraph 44), '
justified by the fact that the interventions of each central
bank on the foreign exchange markets result not only
from the external payment situation of the country
concerned but also from the application of the agreement
on the narrowing of margins . In addition, a progressive
pooling of reserves would enable all the Fund' s functions
to develop regularly and would prepare the way for its
later absorption into the Community system of central
banks, as planned in the Council Resolutions. These
members also felt that if a start was not made on pooling
reserves, the creation of a Fund would lose a great part of
its importance.
Finally, the Committee stresses that the list of techniques
described in the report by the group of experts is not
exhaustive and that the whole problem needs to be
studied more deeply.
A member of the Committee proposed a plan for the
beginning of a pooling of reserves: under this plan each
country would deposit with the Fund the equivalent in
dollars of its share in short-term monetary support and
the equivalent of twice this share (1) in its national
currency. The Fund would credit the member countries
with the corresponding amount in units of account and
this could be used for the settlement of positions resulting
from interventions by the central banks. Furthermore, the
(1) The shares of the central banks of the member countries of the
enlarged Community in short-term monetary support are (in
millions of units of account):
Deutsche Bundesbank
Banque Nationale de Belgique
Banque de France
Banca d'Italia
Nederlandsche Bank
Denmarks Nationalbank
Central Bank of Ireland
Norges Bank
Bank of England
300
100
300
200
100
17.5
37-5
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Fund could buy back for national currencies, from
countries so desiring, dollar assets which those countries
were forced to accumulate following the inflow of
speculative capital. This technique would make it possible
to introduce a guarantee in European units of account,
which would be granted jointly by the Member States in
proportion to their shares. The Committee has not been
able to judge this plan and its technical and financial
implications, but considers that a thorough study should
be made of it
D.  Unit of account
The multilateralization of positions, whatever form it may
take, implies recourse to a unit of account (paragraphs
56-60). To begin with, it would be possible to adopt the
unit of account which is currently used in the Community
(i.e. 0.88867088 grams of fine gold).
III. Organization and articles
The Committee was, generally speaking, in agreement
with the section in the experts' report devoted to the
organization and articles of the Fund (paragraphs 61-67).
The question of the division of responsibilities between
the various competent authorities was raised.
IV. Conclusions
Despite the diversity of views expressed on certain aspects
of the functions which might be assigned to the Fund, the
members agreed unanimously that, if the Fund were set
up, it could assume on its creation not only the
management of short-term monetary support but also the
tasks described in the experts' report under IV A, 'The
organization of concertation between the central banks
IV B (ii) (a) 'The multilateralization of positions resulting
from financing at very short term , IV B (ii) (b) 'The
link-up between the two types of financing' and IV D
Unit of account . The Committee is aware that many
questions, in particular some of those listed above, must
be examined in further detail before the Fund can be set
up and also with a view to the later development of its
tasks.
THE ADJUSTMENT PROCESS - USE OF QUANTITATIVE INDICATORS
ANNEX IV
A. General considerations
1. Deputies representing member countries of the EEC
share the view expressed in the US paper
(C/XX/Dep/Doc/72/10) that ' reformed international
monetary system should promote prompter and more
effective adjustment of balance of payments disequilibria
indeed, this view has been reinforced by the events of the
first half of February which have also demonstrated the
validity of the Canadian Deputies' observation that ' the
principal failure of the system is that it has not been able
to accomodate the large secular shift in the economic
growth of continental Europe and Japan
(C/XX/Dep/Doc/73/15) .
2. At the same time, we believe that it is important 
preserve as much of the Bretton Woods' system as
possible to serve as a foundation for a reformed system.
In particular, it seems to us vital to retain the concept of
fundamental disequilibrium' because this implies that
both internal and external factors have to be taken into
account when reaching a judgment about the need for
adjustment. This is not to deny the usefulness of
quantitative indicators  but to see them rather as a
means of making the concept of fundamental
diesequilibrium operationally effective.
3. The need which we see to retain this concept is also
founded on our belief that while  as the US paper
recognizes  no automatic rule prescribing the choice of
adjustment policy is possible, any choice by a major
country is a matter of concern to the international
community; this is true whether the choice falls on
domestic policy measures, on the exchange rate, on
controls on the capital account or on some combination
of the three. In the final analysis the choice must be one
for the Government of the country concerned in the light
of the structural circumstances of that country; but the
rest of the international community must if the
adjustment process is to work more effectively, be in a
position to have their views taken into account. Further
discussion is needed about the implementation of this
principle.
4. Some further general observations should be made
here about the concept of symmetry. There are obvious
asymmetries inherent in the size of the US, and in the
relation between the internal and external sectors of its
economy, as compared with the size and economies of the
individual members of the EEc. Such differences will
diminish as European integration proceeds but in the
meantime it is essential to take proper account of their9. 11. 73 Official Journal of the European Communities No C 94/19
existence. Nevertheless we accept that, so far as possible
there should be equivalent treatment of the dollar and
other major currencies. Similarly, the burden of
adjustment should  again as far as possible 
symmetrically shared between surplus and deficit
countries. Recent decisions on exchange rates were in
accordance with these principles.
5. As far as symmetry between surplus and deficit
countries is concerned, however, there are conflicting
considerations which need to be borne in mind.
Guidelines for the consultation process might usefully
draw attention to these, in particular:
(a) There is some need to stress the value of symmetry
and to encourage the consultation process to bear
upon surplus as well as deficit countries because of
the heavy bias of natural pressures against deficit
countries.
(b) The belief that the present degree of inflationary
pressures in the world economy  which may well
persist  makes it appropriate for deficit countries to
be required to bear somewhat more of the burden of
adjustment. This is relevant to the value of the
numeraire in terms of which currency values may
change and in this context the conditions for the
future agreed creation of international liquidity will
be a major significance.
(c) In many given situations of international
disequilibrium it is likely that the positions of most
individual countries will be felt to be in mutual
harmony, whilst one or more others are diverging
relatively. It would seem right as a general principle
to seek the minimum number of adjustments and to
this end the international community should press for
adjustment by those diverging from the main group at
the time, irrespective of whether they are in surplus or
in deficit.
6. It seems to us important to recognize that the
available evidence (vide C/XX/Dep/Doc/73/3 and 
points to a real distinction to be made between
quantitative indicators which may be useful:
(a) as signals for the start of a consultation procedure;
(b) as creating a presumption that adjustment action is
required.
We accordingly propose to discuss the use of quantitative
indicators in the adjustment process under two headings
signals for consultation and presumptions for
adjustment action.
B. Signals for consultation
7. The Chairman summing-up at the January
Deputies' meeting reflects very fairly the discussions which
had taken place about consultation. In particular, we
should like to express our agreement with his formulation
that, whatever is done to improve the machinery of
consultation, it should 'supplement rather than supersede
existing procedures.' While there will be a need for
institutional changes in the IMF, discussion of which will
come at a later stage, the existing procedures for
consultation between the Fund and its members have built
up a corpus of knowledge and experience which can help
to make more effective a more regular multilateral
framework for consultations.
8. While the existing Fund consultation arrangements
will continue to allow adequate surveillance of the need
for adjustment by the majority of its members, such
consultations now take place  unless the member has a
floating exchange rate or has drawn in the higher credit
tranches  only at fairly long intervals. This means that
the detection of incipient disequilibria is necessarily
imperfect  in particular as regards surplus countries and
more generally, as regards imbalances which may arise
from adjustment actions taken by other countries.
9. We believe that these deficiencies can be overcome
by giving the management of the IMFa specific mandate:
(a) to keep the balance of payments positions of at least
the major countries under continuous review;
(b) to call the attention of the Fund Board at any time to
situations which appear to merit further examination
in other words, to initiate the process of
consultation.
In this connection guidelines might be offered to the
management to ensure that special attention was given to
evidence of any structural changes emerging in the
balance of payments, even where offsetting tendencies
within the overall balance were leaving official reserves
una1fected. Members of the Fund would also have the
obligation to call for examination of payments
developments both in their own and in other countries
which the Fund management appeared to be ignoring.
This provision would go 'a long way towards overcoming
one of the difficulties which we foresee in the US proposal
to use one single indicator to trigger the consultation
process.
10. The comprehensive procedure suggested above
which is quite similar to that put forward by the
Canadian Deputies, might be thought sufficient on its
own to provide signals that examination was appropriate
and that the consultation procedure should be set in
motion. However, it would be a helpful safeguard to
provide also for the use of a quantitative indicator or
indicators.
11. Two approaches are possible  to  use  one
indicator or several; there are difficulties in constructing
any useful composite indicator for this purpose, although
this problem might be further explored. In favour of using
several indicators is that this would reduce the risk both
of wrong signals leading to unnecessary consultations and
more importantly, of a necessary consultation not being
signalled; however, this latter risk can perhaps be averted
by use of our suggestions in paragraph 8 above. Against
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be faced with conflicting signals and that in general their
use might militate against the need for promptness in
consulting with countries which may be in incipient
disequilibrium. On balance, therefore, we are in favour of
selecting one single indicator of the need to set the
consultation process in motion.
12. The choice seems to us to lie between reserve
movements and basic balances, while recognizing that the
historical evidence suggests that neither would be entirely
satisfactory on its own (vide  C/XX/Dep/Doc/73/3).
However, we accept that there are good reasons for
preferring reserve movements as an indicator of the need
for consultation, notably:
(i) their conceptual advantage, expounded by the US
Deputies both orally and in writing, in relation to a
regime of convertibility;
(ii) the speed at which they become available is in accord
with the need for promptness in initiating
examination and consultation; and
(iii) the relative ease with which common standards for
composition can be achieved and the absence of any
need for extended analysis.
13. However, before adopting reserve movements as the
sole indicator of  need for consultation further
exploration is needed of three aspects:
(a) to what extent should movements in actual reserves be
used, as opposed to movements from adjusted levels
which would take account of individual countries
reserve needs?
(b) should movements in gross or net reserves be used
and what common definition of the components of
either can be found?
Should special account be taken of movements in the
liabilities of  reserve currency country in
circumstances where full asset settlement is not in
force?
(c) should a consultation be triggered by a reserve
movement to a defined level above or below the base
figure, and, if so, how large a movement would be
appropriate? Or should one seek to apply the concept
of a maximum percentage movement over time for
each major country  perhaps by establishing a
proportionate relationship between sizes of reserve
movements and some outside criterion such as IMF
quotas?
The choices made under (a), (b) and (c) above must take
account of the problem of existing market sensitivity to
movements in reserves. This may be no more than a
transitional problem, as markets learn that:
(i) reserve movements, while leading to consultation, do
not always lead to adjustment action and, 
particular, to exchange rate changes;
(ii) adjustment action may sometimes be taken in the
absence of reserve movements.
However, given that the ways in which the questions in
(a), (b) and (c) above are answered are not likely to
remain secret, this will be an important problem in the
early stages of a reformed system.
14. To summarize this section, our preference 
indicated in paragraph 9 above  for a continuing
process of examination and consultation is strengthened
by the difficulties which we foresee in using even the most
attractive single indicator of the need for consultation. It
seems reasonable, therefore, to expect that a procedure
like the one which we have outlined  which would no
doubt be improved in the light of experience  would
work well enough to allow the use of a quantitative
indicator as a signal for consultation eventually to be
dispensed with. It might also happen that a quantitative
indicator different from the one originally selected would
be shown by experience to work more effectively. For
these reasons we would be opposed to including in the
revised Article of the IMF any code of procedure for the
initiation. of consultations.
C. Quantitative indicators as presumptions for adjustment
action
15. As has already been clearly stated, we do not accept
that any quantitative indicators should be used 
automatic signals for action  whether to compel action
or to permit action of a sort that might otherwise 
subject to international scrutiny. We therefore do not
agree with the proposal in the US paper that small
devaluations should be freely permitted, without the need
for IMF approval, whenever a country reserves are
below a base level.
16. On the other hand, we support the view that it
should be possible, through the processes of consultation
to create the presumption that measures of adjustment are
desirable. These presumptions could become stronger as
successive stages in the consultations procedure are
completed. If the failure of one country (or a few
countries) to take adjustment action  whether domestic
or external  that has been generally judged to be
desirable were to lead to significant difficulties for the
international system as a whole, we accept that it should
be permissible in the last resort for other countries to
adopt compensating measures. We therefore endorse the
general approach of ' graduated response' which 
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17. An example of the type of situation in which
compensating measures would be justifiable is where one
country persistently accumulates reserves on a scale that is
out of all proportion to the rate of creation of primary
reserves in the system.
18. A key question is how far the judgments that ar,
arrived at in the course of consultation, and particularly
the identification of fundamental disequilibrium, are to be
guided by the use of quantitative indicators. The
simplicity of movements in reserves was a leading reason
why we were prepared to accept them as a trigger for
consultation, but it is that same simplicity that demands
great caution in accepting reserve movements as a
presumptive signal for adjustment action. It is necessary to
identify the separate components of any movement 
reserves before any judgment can be reached on the need
for action or on the type of action that would 
appropriate. The first distinction to be made is between
the basic balance and movements of mobile capital.
Among the possible responses to reserve changes brought
about by short-term capital flows, one that might be
appropriate in certain circumstances is simply to finance
them until they are reversed. It is envisaged that the
normal rules of asset settlement might be modified at
times of heavy flows of mobile capital, perhaps through
the provision of a special short-term financing facility
under the surveillance of the IMF. The persistence of such
flows, or their resistance to attempts to control or reverse
them, might call for a more positive response, as 
pointed out in the US paper. In particular, it would be
sensible to explore the possibility of treating continuing
flows of capital, even though they took the form of
purchase or sale of short-term assets and liabilities, as
structural flows and therefore as forming part of the basic
balance. Another structural problem to be resolved, would
be how to cover situations in which a deficit was being
financed by increases in private foreign holdings of a
particular currency.
19. With this qualification, the state of and prospects
for the basic balance is believed to be a better leading
guide to the general need for adjustment than is the
movement in reserve levels. With both indicators, there is
the problem that has been recognized in Part V of the 
paper, that the present distribution of reserves does not
correspond with any reasonably defined equilibrium
position. It is to be expected that countries will aim at
basic balances, and corresponding movements in reserves
which will help to adjust their reserve stock to a more
desired level. There can therefore be no simple and
universal measure of the reserve movement or of the basic
balance that can be regarded as representing a position of
equilibrium for every country. Measurement must
necessarily be against some notional set of balance of
payments aims, which must be both realistic for individual
countries and, if the principle of symmetry within the
system is to be upheld, consistent with each other and
with the rate of reserve creation.
20. It will, moreover, often be important to have regard
to the composition of the basic balance in expressing
balance of payments objectives. It has to be recognized
that countries do in practice have separate objectives for
the balances of cunent or of long-term capital
transactions. It might perhaps be possible to develop a
code of conduct for capital transactions whose universal
observance amongst developed countrieS' would enable
the basic balance to be adopted as a single indicator. Such
code might provide, for example, that developed
countries should be expected to ensure that their net
outflow of long-term capital to other developed countries
should not be large or persistent.
21. In many cases, this condition might be satisfied
without any need to operate specific controls over capital
flows  as US representatives argued would be so of their
country, in the discussions preceding the Smithsonian
agreement. But the suggested code would require that
effective controls should be available for use if necessary,
should the condition not be met. A code on these lines
would conform with the principle that there should be no
restriction on the flow of long-term resources to
developing countries, or on the earning of current
surpluses, to finance such flows. Failing agreement on a
code for capital transactions, the use of the basic balance
as the leading indicator of the need for adjustment action
would need to be supplemented by consideration of cur-
rent account balances, particularly in arriving at a jud-
gment on the nature of the adjustment action required. It
would also be relevant to consider information on cost
and price trends, including the probable future effects of
past and present changes in competitiveness which have
not fully worked themselves out, before coming to 
final judgment.
22. Even if eval~tion of the basic balance and other
indicators should lead to the conclusion that the required
adjustment includes changes in the current account, there
need still be no presumption that a change in exchange
rates is called for. It has to be asked, first, to what extent
the observed current balance has been affected by cyclical
factors which may be expected, over a period of time, to
cancel themselves out. Imbalances attributable to different
countries being at different stages in the economic cycle
call for purdy domestic action on demand management.
Domestic action, seeking to influence cost and price
trends, may well be the appropriate response where an
incipient imbalance is detected in the underlying
(cyclically adjusted) current balance. Those departures
from balance that would not be eliminated by domestic
action alone would be indicative of fundamental
disequilibrium, and under such circumstances an exchange
rate change would normally be both justifiable and
desirable.No C 94/22 Official Journal of the European Communities 11. 73
23. To summarize the conclusions of this section, while
we accept quantitative indicators as an integral part of the
consultations process, we do not believe that any single
indicator, or any group of indicators, can be used in a
general and uniform manner to establish an automatic
presumption that adjustment action is needed. We believe
that the basic balance is the most satisfactory leading
indicator for adjustment action, but argue against too
ready a presumption that exchange rate adjustment is the
appropriate action. A number of other factors need to be
taken into account, most notably the composition of the
basic balance. We see a place in certain circumstances for
specific action to regulate capital flows, including flows of
long-term or structural capital. Abov, all, we are
convinced that the successful working of the adjustment
process, through consultation among countries, depends
on the willingness of all participants to make it work: this
cannot be assured by the adoption of automatic signals
for adjustment action, which might well damage rather
than contribute to the spirit of international cooperation.
ANNEX 
REPORT ON THE ACTIVITIES OF THE WORKING PARTY ON SECURITIES MARKETS
During the period covered by this report (October 1971 to
October 1972), trends on the Community s bond markets
were, generally speaking fairly favourable. The volume of
issues increased on all the markets, while interest rates
tended, in the main, to ease down in most of the
countries, at least until September 1972.
These developments are the reflection of a trend in the
formation - new saving which, despite the persistence 
and indeed the strengthening  of inflation, was high, of
the growing interest of private investors in fixed-income
securities, and of an exceptional abundance of liquidity.
Nevertheless borrowers were apparently somewhat
hesitant to contract loans, mainly because of uncertainty
as to interest rate trends, and in several countries potential
subscribers were increasingly sensitive to interest rate
levels.
However, trends were not uniform in all the countries.
For example, in the Netherlands, and, to a lesser extent
in Belgium, the downward interest rate trend levelled out
for a time in the spring of 1972; in Germany, the situation
actually grew tighter on the market at this time, and
interest rate levels have risen by more than 1  since
then, despite an appreciable decline in the volume of
issues. In Italy, the interest rates have been stable since
June after a long period of decline. In France, where
interest rates had not declined in 1971 as they had in the
other countries, there was a more definite downward
trend. In addition, towards the end of the period under
review interest rates tended to fall, in all the countries
except Italy, mainly as a result of more restrictive
monetary policies. So that the mutual relationships of the
different countries underw,ent a change, although all the
rates are still within a range fairly similar to that
obtaining at the beginning of the' period, except that the
span between lowest and highest rates has become a little
wider, growing from 1.25 to 1.5 %.
The highest rates were in Germany, and not in France as
in the previous year. Germany was also the country in
which the interest rate decline was smallest, and Italy was
the country in which rates declined most.
Official policies in the member countries with regard to
their capital markets were broadly similar  there was
little attempt to oppose market tendencies. The factors,
which, operating freely, tended to widen the markets,
increase the volume of issues and bring down interest
rates were allowed to work unopposed: nor was any
attempt made to curb increases where the adjustment of
capital supply and demand made such increases necessary
or where the authorities felt that in view of the loss of
purchasing power of money, there was a case for
maintaining the rewards accruing to savers. Indeed,
certain countries take the view that there are structural
reasons for maintaining interest rates at a sufficiently high
level.
In almost all the member countries, the equities markets
somewhat depressed in the fourth quarter of 1971, gained
strength from the beginning of the new year, the stock
exchanges having anticipated the business revival.
Prices rose particularly sharply in the Netherlands and in
France. However Italy, where the economic outlook
showed little improvement, was left completely outside
this trend. At the end of the third quarter of 1972, prices
began to fall again in several countries. All in all, issuers
took little advantage of the favourable trend which
prevailed during most of the period to increase the11. 73 Official Journal of the European Communities No C 94/23
volume of issue: the figure for this variable remained
relatively modest.
In  Germany,  the capital market was fairly receptive. For
one thing, household saving continued to expand sharply
and savers showed a particular interest in fixed-income
securities; secondly, there was a heavy inflow of foreign
capital, the bulk of which, in the period up to the end of
June, was being invested in German securities. In
addition, the banks increased their securities portfolios
particularly in January and February 1972. Interest rates
declined early in 1972, though from March onwards there
was a steady upward movement. The trend changed
direction because private investors and the banks
expecting an increase in interest rates on the capital
market due to the heavy and persistent demand for
capital, were holding off the market.
To facilitate market stabilization
, '
one-time issuers
stopped borrowing at the end of March: the pause was
maintained until the end of May. Only after this date
were issues resumed, with a German State Railway loan.
The nominal interest rate, which had fallen to 7 % at the
end of February had to be raised, after a period of strain
in two steps to 8  during March. It was once again
possible to place 'one-time' issues at this rate from June
onwards without difficulty on the capital market.
Although there was a fairly large number of foreign loans
denominated in DM, they had no decisive influence on
the German capital market, since they were virtually all
subscribed by foreign investors. As domestic issues also
remained very attractive for non-residents, capital imports
again increased appreciably because of transactions in
internal DM loans, many of them generated by official
Swiss action to stem capital imports. So that the Federal
German Government was compelled to impose an import
licence, at the end of June, for purchases by non-residents
of bearer and registered bonds issued on the domestic
market.
In view of the important role which foreign capital had
played in the placing of German fixed-income securities in
the first half of the year, there was some reason to fear a
fall in market prices; this, however, did not occur, partly
because private domestic investors took over from the
non-residents. Since the beginning of September, the
Bundesbank has relaxed the import authorization scheme
and authorized credit establishments  in the first
instance, for six months only  to sell to foreigners
domestic fixed-income securities in amounts not exceeding
those of the securities of this kind previously sold by
non-residents in the Federal Republic of Germany or
maturing in the portfolios they hold.
Since a recovery in business activity and an improvement
in profits were foreseen in 1972, the equities market was
lively from November 1971 onwards. The increase in
prices further strengthened by the interest of
non-residents in German equities, continued until the end
of August with a few short interruptions. Subsequently, as
the business recovery proved only modest, the market lost
tone and prices fell.
In the last weeks, the upward movement in interest rates
already mentioned gathered momentum, entailing an
appreciable increase in the cost of long-term capital. This
should curb the demand for capital goods, particularly in
the building and construction industry.
In  France,  ample funds were available on the bond
market, as that in the fourth quarter of 1971 and in the
first quarter of 1972 the volume of issues was appreciably
higher' than in the same quarters of the preceding years.
However, the rate of issues slowed down in the second
quarter of 1972 because private borrowers and the public
authorities had adopted a 'wait-and-see' attitude, the
former having preferred less expensive bank credit, the
latter having accounted for a considerable proportion of
their borrowing requirements during the first quarter. The
exceptional results achieved during the period under
review as a whole owed a good deal to the maintenance
of nominal rates at a high level: with the value of money
still declining, it would not have been desirable to reduce
the remuneration earned by household saving, and the
high rates did not, in fact impair industrial investment or
hamper the efforts of companies to improve their financial
structure. However, the declining rates on the secondary
market which gathered momentum from January
onwards, and the relaxation of conditions on markets
abroad led the banks to reduce nominal rates by 0.25 %
on two occasions, in agreement with the authorities. This
brought them down to 8.25 % and then to 8 % by the
end of April.
The depressed trends on the equities market in the fourth
quarter of 1971 gave way to exceptionally favourable
stock exchange conditions from the beginning of 1972
onwards. This was partly due to buying by non-residents.
On the other hand, the amount of equities issues dropped
during the fourth quarter of 1971 and again in the first
quarter of 1972. The situation showed some improvement
thereafter, but figures recorded in the first half of 1972
still fell short of those reached in the first half of 1971.
In  Italy,  the bond market continued to develop
favourably. The appreciable increase in the volume of
issues on the domestic market in the last quarter of 1971
continued in the first half of 1972; supply, both from the
public, which subscribed 60 % of the new issues, and
from financial intermediaries in a position to provide
ample funds, responded to the high level of net demand
for funds. So that the Banca d'Italia was able to sell bonds
in an amount of Lit. 187000 million in the first eight
months of 1972, although it had been a net purchaser of
Lit. 312 000 million in the corresponding period of 1971.
The Treasury and the nationalized undertakings were the
main beneficiaries of the increase in bond issues, followed
by international institutions. Personal-property credit
establishments latJer became important among the chief
borrowers.
The fall in yields which began in the middle of 1971
continued in the last quarter of the year. This trend was
tending to mark time in the first two months of 1972, but
a substantial decline occurred in April and May, followed
in the most recent period by stable yields at a slightlyNo C 94/24 Official Journal of the European Communities 11. 73
higher level (about 71/2 %). The downward trend was
encouraged by the monetary authorities, which pursued a
policy designed to promote  recovery in industrial
investment and at the same time to align domestic rates
on those obtaining on foreign markets.
Italian borrowers were using foreign markets much less in
1971 than in 1970. This was mainly due to a trend in the
last quarter, during which, in the absence of new issues on
the international market, redemptions of loans contracted
abroad entailed net capital outflows of the order of $500
million. The movement continued during the first part of
1972, during which $600 million were reimbursed in this
way. During the summer, this attitude changed, and
financial institutions again turned to the international
market.
There was no steady trend on the equities market. The
definite expansion in the volume of issues in the last of
1971, as compared with the corresponding quarter of
1970, gave way, in the first quarter of 1972, to a sharp
decline, which was then in its turn followed by a recovery
of issues in the second quarter, mainly in favour of small-
and medium-sized firms. The stock exchange market, on
which the number of transactions was relatively low
throughout the period under review, showed few
important changes during the last months of 1971 and the
first quarter of 1972; the upward movement in prices
which then began more than offset the fall in the first
quarter.
In the  Netherlands,  interest rates fell in the latter months
of 1971. Business activity was losing momentum at the
end of the year, and the decline in interest rates gathered
pace early in 1972, so that the trend then matched those
recorded on foreign markets. The movement changed
direction in the spring of 1972, mainly because the supply
situation was weak, but early in the second half of the
year interest rates one again declined slightly.
Throughout the period under review, the bond market
was sufficiently flexible. The demand for funds was
exceptionally high in the last quarter of 1971, and the
volume of issues in the first three quarters of 1972
remained heavy. Virtually all of these issues were placed
with residents, the supply of funds from abroad making
only a marginal contribution to the placing of domestic
securities since the introduction of the ' bond-florin
Initially, the aim of the Nederlandsche Bank was to
forestall any unduly rapid decline in interest rates. From
the spring-time onwards, official attitudes moved to a
more neutral position, the intention being to allow the
market equilibrium to be established by independent
forces. In April, certain official measures were taken to
promote the liberalization of capital movements and to
provide incentives to capital exports. For this purpose, the
Nederlandsche Bank declared its willingness to authorize
non-residents to issue private loans denominated in florins
on the market. However, not many borrowers availed
themselves of this facility.
Prices on the equities market fell in October and
November 1971 but then rose steadily and continuously
almost throughout the period under review, the main
reason being the sustained interest of foreign subscribers
in this market. Share issues, which are traditionally weak
in the Netherlands, totalled Fl. 38 million in the first three
quarters of 1972, compared with Fl. 58 million in the
corresponding quarters of 1971.
The  Belgian capital market  expanded sharply during the
period under review. The volume of issues reached a very
high, perhaps exceptional level, in the periods up to the
end of the first quarter of 1972. The trend lost a little
momentum in the second quarter, but there was a further
recovery in the third quarter. This trend was accompanied
by a slow but steady decline in interest rates, which began
at the beginning of 1971 and which was interrupted for
only a short period in the spring of 1972: in the third
quarter interest rates were again running at an
exceptionally low level.
There was no difficulty as to the subscribing of issues
since capital saving was still being formed in large
amounts. Apart from a convertible bond issue in the
Siecond quarter, only the public sector was using the
market. Faced with a heavy inflow of foreign capital, the
central Government increased the volume of domestic
issues for a short time beyond its borrowing requirement
and this enabled a large proportion of its external debt
to be redeemed.
On the equities market prices fell during the
August-November 1971 period, but thereafter made steady
progress. On the  Luxembourg capital market the market
for loans denominated in Luxembourg francs was opened
to non-resident borrowers.
With a view to forestalling any disequilibrium that might
result from this measure, the Luxembourg authorities
introduced an issue schedule for 1972 based, normally, on
a quarterly volume of issue of about Lfrs. 300 to 4D0
million. The market accounted very easily for the sums
foreseen in the schedule for the first half of the year
whilst yields continued to decline. On the other hand, the
public supply in Luxembourg of, Euro-Ioan Siecurities
slowed down a little from the fourth quarter of 1971
onwards, because of the perceptible decline in issues
denominated in units of account.
Trends on the countries individual markets were
generally favourable and this was also true for the
international markets,  where, indeed, trends were even
more favourable in certain respects. In the period from the
fourth quarter of 1971 to the third quarter of 1972, the
volume of issues totalled $5 300 million, compared with
$4 800 million in the preceding twelve months. Out 
this total, issues denominated in $ US accounted for
$2600 million, i.e. 49.6 % (1), international loans in DM
$1 200 million, i.e. almost a quarter of the issues, issues
in Swiss francs, $576 million, i.e. 10.9 %.
(1) The percentage for conventional bond issues, not including con-
vertible bonds, is substantially lower.11. 73 Official Journal of the European Communities No C 94/25
As in the past, currencies of issue were chosen on the
basis of an assessment of the exchange risk and of interest
conditions prevailing on the various markets. In this
connection, it is noteworthy that disparities between the
interest or yield rates on the markets of the individual
issue currencies widened in periods of increased
instability and, in their turn, narrowed down when
confidence in the stability of the current relationships of
the principal currencies was restored. The respective
trends of rates of yield on DM and dollar issues in
particularly illuminating in this respect.
The rapid adjustments of rates of yield also had the effect
of keeping the distribution of the issued amounts by
currency relatively stable. Issues denominated in US
dollars still account for more than half of the total; those
denominated in DM and in Swiss francs also showed little
variation. Only the French franc made noteworthy gains
as an international issue currency, while issues in
Luxembourg francs constitute a recent development the
future of which it is too early to foresee. Moreover, the
volume of international private-treaty loans denominated
in florins (not included in the figures given above)
increased sharply.
Interest rates generally tended to fall during the greater
part of the period under review. Yields on issues in US
dollars fell back relatively fast from the very high level
reached in the autumn of 1971, even before the
Washington agreements terminated the period of
insecurity caused by the adoption of floating exchange
rates; during the first three quarters of 1972, they
fluctuated within a narrow range; at the end of the period
they were tending to ease downwards. Under the
influence of very heavy purchases by non-resident
investors, a sharp fall in interest rates on international
bonds denominated in DM was recorded, occurring
mainly during the first half of 1972.
Having fallen to about 53/4 % in August, following the
ban on purchases of bonds issued by German borrowers
the rates recovered by almost 1 % because of arbitrage
operations in favour of bonds denominated in currencies
providing better yields and because of the heavy volume
of new issues. As a result of a policy of cautious official
authorization, interest rates on the international Swiss
franc loan market dropped by about half a percentage
point  from 6 to  5112 
% - 
at the beginning of the
period under review. Since then, however, interest rates
have staged a recovery because of the restoration of
confidence in the dollar, which made the Swiss currency
relatively less attractive and brought home more strongly
to investors how relatively low are yields on these
securities. On the international market in private-treaty
loans denominated in florins, trends were much like
those on the market for international loans denominated
in DM. International issues in French francs were fairly
successful in the early part of the period, and this enabled
borrowers to cut interest rates; however, in the third
quarter of 1972, conditions deteriorated as a result of a
plethora of new issues on the market and the revival of
interest in issues denominated in other currenCIes
particularly in US dollars.
The policy of the Member States' monetary authorities
with regard to the international bond markets consisted in
allowing participation, within certain limits, in these
markets, while endeavouring to cushion the impact of
such participation on their economies, by various means.
The measures used were carefully selected and applied
and the policies took account  to extents varying
according to country and period 
balance-of-payments considerations and of considerations
arising from current business trends or structural needs.
For example, the authorities made access for resident
borrowers to international markets more difficult in
Germany and in France, while the Italian authorities
encouraged such access in Italy, the aim in the first case
being to avoid capital inflows, and in the second case to
facilitate such inflows.
Again, the authorities, while favouring capital exports
offered an uneven range of facilities for the placing of
Euro-issues with their residents. Placing by public offer
remained limited in Belgium and France, while it was
authorized very freely in Germany. In addition, the
contribution of Belgian and Luxembourg subscribers to
the Euro-issues market expanded, although certain limits
were set to the placing with residents of these countries of
loans denominated in Luxembourg francs, the volume of
which increased appreciably.
Indeed, on some occasions the authorities intervened to
control both inflows and outflows of capital, for example
in the Netherlands, by forbidding the use within the
country of the yield from Euro-issues on the one hand
and by reducing the scope for issues in florins for
non-resident borrowers, on the other. In France, exchange
controls were maintained, although they were used mainly
to curb capital inflows.
Moreover, by authorizing, under certain conditions, the
development of Euro-issues in Community currencies
several Member States made it possible to meet the
non-resident investors' need for diversification in their
investments. At the same time they avoided capital flows
deemed undesirable and endeavoured to shield the
domestic national markets from the influence of external
factors. Here, it was felt that the financial institutions of
the countries concerned should assume control of the
guarantee and placing consortia for these issues, so as to
ensure fuller implementation of official policy. Thus, the
authorities also improved the position of the financial
institutions of their own countries in the guarantee and
placing consortia for international loans, at their request.
This was a contribution to the development of the
international status of their capital markets.
Another constructive aspect of the use of certain European
currencies as media for Euro-issues is the fact that 
facilitates the participation in the international market of
Community issuers and investors and that it strengthens
the role of Community currencies alongside the dollar in
international financial transactions.
In the last analysis, this development reflects an increased
participation of European t'ransactions in the Euro- issues
market, the gradual scaling-down of conventional foreign
issues on each of the national markets and continuing an
even severer market fragmentation. The result has been a
considerable build-up in Euro-issues, particularly inNo C 94/26 Official Journal of the European Communities 11. 73
Community currencies, instead of the integration of the
national markets into a common capital market.
Nonetheless, there is no escaping the fact that at the
present time the development of Euro-markets in DM, FF,
Fl., and Lirs. separated from the national markets is
leading to the juxtaposition of isolated markets, of narrow
resources and weaker than an integrated European market
would be. While an increase in conventional foreign issues
would help to widen the range of securities available on
each of the national markets, and more intra-Community
placings would have the effect of broadening the supply
of capital on these markets the development of
Euro-issues, even in Community currencies, does not bring
with it the important advantage which an integration of
the national markets should provide that of
overcoming their narrowness. It is true that for
balance-of-payments reasons, several member countries
are opposed to an increase on their markets of the supply
of capital from abroad.
Another point is that as the Euro-issues market has no
withholding tax, even the Member States wishing to
maintain this tax on their domestic markets have been
virtually unable to apply it to their residents where they
are issuing on the international market, nor to all the
Euro-issues in their own currencies, and the effect of this
has been to give the Euro-issue market an advantage over
the national markets. This development may well be
connected with the fact that interest rates for Euro-issues
in the Community currencies have been running below
those for domestic issues, at least for French francs and
the DM (1). It is probably also connected with the
tendency towards specialization of the markets which
seems to be gathering momentum in certain countries,
since the main borrowers on the Euro-issues market
belong rather to the private sector than to the public
sector, whereas public borrowers account for most of the
business on the national markets. In the long run,
(1) There is a 25 % withholding tax for non-residents drawing
interest on domestic DM and FF issues, but Euro-issues in these
currencies are exempt.
distortions of this nature could have disadvantages of
which a common capital market based on harmonized
taxation would be free. Suggestions in this connection
were made in the Working Party s last annual report.
It goes without saying that the integration of the
Community markets will necessitate coordination of
economic and monetary policies and elimination of risks
deriving from possible parity changes, i.e. in effect, a
single currency. However, even before progress on such a
large scale is made on the monetary level, interpenetration
of the national capital markets by the gradual mutual
concession of facilities for floating issues by an increase in
security quotations from other member countries and by
an increase in the scope for mutual placing by member
countries' residents on the domestic markets would yield
some of the advantages to be expected from the
development of a European capital market which the
Euro-issue market cannot provide.
The Working Party regrets that developments in the
course of the year brought the Community no nearer
these objectives. Balance-of-payments considerations in
certain countries and differing trends in business activity
delayed monetary integration and actually led to the
creation of additional barriers between the countries.
In this context, the Working Party believes that there can
be no complete and lasting integration of the
Community securities markets before disparities in
business trends in the member countries, and therefore in
the economic and monetary policies, have been narrowed
down. Consequently, it believes that progress in monetary
integration must be made if capital market policies are to
be harmonized; this finding does not mean that efforts
should not be continued in this field or that any
opportunity should be neglected to eliminate institutional
and technical obstacles to the reciprocal opening of the
capital markets.S
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Note on stock market yields graph
For the Member States the reference is to the rates considered as the most representative on
the market. In the absence of series for the entire market, the rates referred to are those of the
issuers operating most frequently on the relevant market.
Germany:
France:
Belgium:
Italy:
Netherlands:
Luxembourg:
Euro 
Euro DM:
stock market yield of all fixed-income securities.
stock market yield of bonds issued or guaranteed by the central governm~nt
and bonds having the same status.
stock market yield on state loans maturing in more than five years.
stock market yields on bonds issued by credit institutions (personal prop-
erty credit establishments).
for 1970, stock market yield of the 4.5 % loan of the Bank voor Neder-
landsche Gemeenten: for 1971 and 1972, average of the last three State
loans maturing in 20 years.
stock market yield of thirteen Luxembourg State loans issued from 1955
onwards (14 loans from October 1971 onwards, 15 loans from January
1972 onwards).
average yield on ordinary bonds calculated over the average life of the
loan (source: OECD-BONDTRADE).
stock market yield from bonds of foreign issuers denominated in DM
(source: Deutsche Bundesbank).V
o
l
u
m
e
 
o
f
 
b
o
n
d
 
i
s
s
u
e
s
(
M
i
l
l
i
o
n
s
 
o
f
 
E
U
R
.
 
u
.
1
2
.
0
0
0
1
2
0
9
3
1
1
3
6
6
~
:
)
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
/
:
r
~
G
r
o
s
s
 
f
i
g
u
r
e
s
1
0
3
0
1
I
S
:
s
:
s
J
 
N
e
t
 
f
i
g
u
r
e
s
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
 
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
,
,
~
 
'
8
9
1
-
2
7
2
6
 
2
8
2
6
1
6
3
8
 
I
;
i
-
;
.
;
.
:
.
;
.
;
;
.
;
.
;
.
;
.
.
:
.
:
.
:
.
;
.
 
1
0
1
0
:
'
;
'
:
'
:
'
1
-
'
;
'
;
'
:
'
:
'
;
'
;
'
:
'
;
;
'
;
'
;
'
;
'
;
g
~
 
1
1
M
C
~
 
1
1
1
1
1
 
i
f
;
'
 
C
r
i
l
l
 
:
;
:
1
:
 
I
I
!
~
 
I
I
~
 
I
i
i
 
~
T
I
6
~
 
~
/
 
~
.
;
.
;
.
:
.
:
 
m
i
h
:
'
:
 
~
 
1
8
7
0
 
1
1
7
1
 
1
9
7
2
1
9
7
0
 
1
9
7
1
 
1
1
7
2
 
u
n
o
 
1
W
1
1
 
1
9
7
2
.
 
1
8
7
0
 
1
9
7
1
 
1
9
7
2
1
9
7
0
 
1
9
7
1
 
1
1
7
2
1
9
7
0
 
1
9
7
1
 
1
9
7
2
1
9
7
0
 
1
9
7
1
 
1
9
7
2
1
9
7
0
 
1
9
7
1
 
1
W
1
2
1
1
.
0
0
0
1
0
.
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
.
0
0
0
$
 
O
r
d
i
n
a
r
y
E
u
r
o
 
$
.
 
D
.
M
.
 
F
o
r
e
i
g
n
G
e
r
m
a
n
y
F
r
a
n
c
e
I
t
a
l
y
N
e
t
h
e
r
l
a
n
d
s
B
e
l
g
i
u
m
"
"
'
"
"
"
'
"
'
-
.
.
1
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
,
:
:
"
"
I
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
:
:
r
(
1
)
t
"
1
1
,
:
:
"
"
I
"
C
:
I
(
1
)
,
:
:
.
.
.
 
.
.
.
.
 
.
(
1
)No C 94/30 Official Journal of the European Communities 11. 73
Chairman:
LIST OF MEMBERS OF THE WORKING PARTY ON SECURITIES MARKETS
ANNEX 
GERMANY
BELGIUM
FRANCE
ITALY
LUXEMBOURG
NETHERLANDS
COMMISSION
OF THE EUROPEAN
CO MMUNITIES
SECRETARIAT
F. De Voghel, vice-gouverneur honoraire de la Banque nationale de
Belgique, president de l'Institut de reescompte et de garantie
Brussels
Dr K. Andreas, Leiter der Hauptabteilung Kredit, Deutsche Bundes-
bank, Frankfurt
Ministerialrat Borgbohmer, Bundesministerium der Finanzen, Bonn
Ministerialrat G. Wetzler, Bundesministerium der Finanzen, Bonn
M. D' Haeze, directeur general de l'administration de la tresorerie
et de la dette publique, Brussels
F. Junius, Banque nation ale de Belgique, Brussels
E. Kestens, inspecteur general au ministere des finances, Brussels
Y. Berger, conseiller aupres du gouverneur de la Banque de France
Paris
Ph. Cosserat, direction du tresor, ministere de l'economie et des
finances, Paris
P. de Larosiere, sous-directeur des affaires internationales a la direc-
tion du tresor, ministere de l'economie et des finances, Paris
Mme. L. Beauvais, Banque de France, Paris
Dott. P. Battaglia, condirettore centrale, Banca d'ltalia, Rome
Dott. G. Monterastelli, condirettore centrale, Banca d'Italia, Rome
Dott. M. Napolitano ispettore generale, direzione generale del Te-
soro, ministero del Tesoro, Rome
A. Dondelinger, commissaire au contr6le des banques, Luxembourg
E. Israel, directeur a la Banque internationale, Luxembourg
Drs. M. M. Keyzer, Nederlandsche Bank NV, Amsterdam
Drs. P. C. Timmerman, Onderdirecteur van de Nederlandsche Bank
NV, Amsterdam
Drs. J. Grooters, directeur binnenlands geldwezen, Ministerie van
Financien, The Hague
F. Boyer de la Giroday, Director for Monetary Affairs, Directorate
General for Economic and Financial Affairs, Brussels
M. Sarmet, Chief of Division for Financial Institutions and Capital
Markets, Directorate General for Economic and Financial Affairs
Brussels
M. Zucker, Directorate General for Economic and Financial Affairs
Brussels
G. Morelli, secretary of the Monetary Committee, Brussels
G. Lermen, Brussels